Science and Social Science - Differences and Similarities
By
Rene Brauer
In this essay I intend to explore
the differences and similarities between the natural and the social sciences
(NSS). The essay starts with contrasting the traditional (but still popular)
view of science with that of contemporary science studies. This is followed by
taking this view and discussing the implication for the differences and
similarities between NSS. The aspects that are addressed in regard to the
differences of the NSS are the implications of having a study object rather
than a study subject. Aspects of convergence that are addressed in regard to
the NSS are the core assumptions, how consolidation is achieved and what the influence
of the framework.
“Das
Wiederfinden dessen, was der Mensch in die Dinge gesteckt hat, heißt
Wissenschaft.”[1]
Nietzsche (1844 - 1900)
What is science?
The above quote captures
modernity’s conceptualization towards science. I.e. that science can
‘rediscover’ truths about the world. Only distortions of the human mind (e.g.
ideology, ego or biases) blemish this process. When we keep these in check, truths
about the world can be discovered. This proposition can be found in the writing
of Russell, Popper and Merton and still influences the popular characterisation
of science today (c.f. Sismondo 2011:1-8). This
approach has been called Mode 1[2]
of science studies, and from a contemporary science studies point of view (Mode
3) this conceptualisation appears to be “intellectually
bankrupt” (Collins and Evans 2002:240). Mode 2 of
science studies; that looked at the actual mechanisms of ‘science in action’
(e.g. Shapin, Schaffer et al. 1985;
Bijker, Hughes et al. 1987;
Latour 1987) came to a different conclusion.
Stating that;
“There is no abstract and logical scientific method apart from evolving
community norms”
(Sismondo 2011:10)
Nietzsche coined the concept of perspectivism – i.e. that all ideations
take place from particular perspective. Wissenschaften[3]
are no exception to this proposition. This implies that consolidation of ideas,
within science, cannot be achieved internally (c.f. Chalmers 2013), but rather are a
product of social processes (c.f. Collins and Pinch 1993). All that exists
are heuristics, which are the result
of consolidated community norms. Now this is not to say that these aren’t
useful, quite the contrary (c.f. Latour 2013). But this does
represent a fundamental different approach from the aforementioned
conceptualisation of science being a direct access toward ‘truth’ (according to Mode 1). In
fact, the whole idea of ‘truth’ and how it is achieved is redefined (c.f. Latour, Harman et al. 2011). This conceptual
move and its epistemological implications put the practitioners of science on
the centre stage, rather than ‘truth in itself’.
The differences and similarities between science and the social
sciences
A similarity arises from this conceptualization. As it implies that all different
sub branches of science, despite their apparent differences, are on a fundamental level all human endeavours. Research in this view; pushes the boundaries of
(socially) consolidated knowledge into areas where consensus is not yet
established. Each and every sub branch has its own popular way to deal with
this. In the natural sciences, the term paradigm has been used to describe this
approach to how research ought to be
done, according to the prevailing consensus (i.e. paradigm) of the time (c.f. Kuhn 1970).
Now despite both natural and
social sciences (and humanities) representing such human endeavours there are
differences between the two. One major difference is in the way actors can be treated. In the natural sciences you have a prevailing
reductionist approach turning the actor into a 'passive' research object that
is to be studies. Meanwhile the social sciences have more ‘active actors’
(research subjects). The difference lies in the degree of actionability. This is because the natural sciences tend to deal more with
material actors, while the social sciences deal with human actors. (C.f. Law 1999; Latour 2005 on their definition of actor). This difference allows the natural sciences to manipulate the objects
in such a way which wouldn't be possible with research subjects, as no protest
can be voiced. This difference strengthens the power position of the researcher
within the natural sciences in the research process. As such, the result of this research process (e.g. theories) appear to have an air of certainty which cannot be
achieved within the social sciences to the same degree (Camic, Gross et al. 2012:26). This (with
other factors) creates a ‘hierarchy of certainty’ which usually places pure
mathematics at the far end of the high certainty spectrum, while the social
sciences occupy a lower position.
In a paradoxical way this makes
the social sciences more ‘natural’ than the natural sciences. Because, in the
natural sciences “theories don’t describe
the [real world … rather they] describe
either idealizations or other kinds of fundamental structures” (Sismondo 2011:166) that are
supposedly representative of the real world. Due to the dissent that the
subject can voice, this high degree of abstraction is not possible within the
social science, hence making them more ‘natural’ (if we apply this line of
reasoning). Despite, or rather because, of this difference some social
scientists, departing from a view of science based on Mode 1, lament this fact.
This tendency is usually characterised as physics
envy[4].
Mode 2 science studies had a
heavy bias towards studying the natural sciences. This left a knowledge gap in
how the social sciences operate in their actual practice (see Camic, Gross et al. 2012). However, despite
this gap, some inferences can be made upon the practice of the social science,
because as shown above, they also represent a human process. Three similarities
are worth mentioning; the core assumption of how science ought to be done
(departing from Mode 1), how it is consolidated in practice and the framework
in which they operate in.
The core assumption is that by
applying methodological rigour in empirical studies abstract truths about
reality can be extracted and distilled, bring a closer approximation to
‘reality’ (Law and Urry 2004:13). This builds
on an extrapolation of Mode 1, that there exists one external reality. Mode 2
science studies does not deny the possibility of one external reality, rather
it questions to what extend consensus can be achieved at all. As such, Mode 2
deconstructed science in such a way that it showed the social constructed
nature of science; making all statements about reality relative. Mode 3 science
studies, which sometimes is called the material
turn in science studies (see Bennett and Joyce 2013), has softened
this proposition somewhat. In that it reintroduced realities influence (i.e.
materiality). However, it still reserves the determining power to the social
constructed nature. This means that ‘reality’ is the product of the ‘real
world’ plus social constructions (c.f. Latour 1999). This applies to
all human endeavours, including all branches of science (and the social
sciences).
With this in mind, the way
consolidation is reached is through social consensus (hence social construction
being attributed this determining power, c.f. Harraway 1991, Latour and Woolgar 1979; Shapin, Schaffer et al. 1985;
Yearley 2004). Different mechanisms have
been described how this process is achieved in practice. One way this can be
achieved, that I want to highlight here, can be conceptualized by using an
‘economic metaphor’. This is a redefinition of the Mode 1’s canon; ‘nanos gigantum humeris insidentes.’[5]
In this view the giants are not only aids, but also represent powerful allies. The cost that is involved in unmaking the
newly created network (argument + alliances) determines if a proposition is
accepted as true or false, criticised or praised (Latour and Woolgar 2013:243). The more
alliances that can be mobilized, the harder it becomes to defeat the proposition.
Once enough allies have become (rhetorically) mobilized a statement is accepted
as true, i.e. it is logical (Latour 1987),[6]
this applies to both the NSS.[7]
The third and last, similarity I
want to touch upon between the sciences and the social sciences is that of the
framework in which they operate in. This is probably the aspect in which the
social and natural sciences are most similar to each other. Because, regardless
of what research subject you look at, most research today; is done at
universities, has to apply for research grants, has to be approved by ethics
committees, and has to go through the peer-review process to just name a few.
According to Mode 2, these structural processes are not neutral. Examples of
the influences of the aspects that can be mentioned are: the masculinisation of
the concept used in science (Martin 1991), the effects of
strutural changes (Abbott in Camic, Gross
et al. 2012:43-88)
or the Euro-American domination of research (Law 2004). As said, this is
most likley true for the both natural and social sciences. However, how this
process is influencing the social sciences in particular and more importantly,
what influences do we want this to have is still a big question mark according
to Law and Urry
2004.
References
[1]
‘Rediscovering, what humans have always known, this is what we call
science’ translation by the author
[2] Mode 1: is regarded as the philosophy
of science, which was ended with the publication of Kuhn’s (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Mode 2: was
primarily occupied with socially deconstructing (hard) science, examples are; Latour
and Woolgar 1979; Bloor 1991 or Collins 1981
Mode 3:
emerged with the arrival of STS and the publication of Leviathan and the Air-pump (Shapin and Schaffer 1985), but was
consolidated after the so called Science
Wars (c.f. Gieryn 1999) with the introduction of the so called material turn. This approach (and other)
tries to remarry social construction with expertize (C.f. Collins 2010) and the
‘real’ (material) world (c.f. Latour 2013)
For a more detailed definition of the different modes of science studies, see Collins
and Evans (2002)
[3]
The German word ‘Wissenschaft’ cannot be directly translated to the English
word ‘Science’ as it applies to any study or science that involves systematic
research, including social sciences and the humanities.
[4]
The term physics envy is used to criticize a tendency (perceived or real) of
softer sciences and liberal arts to try to obtain mathematical expressions of
their fundamental concepts, as an attempt to move them closer to harder
sciences, particularly physics and move up on the ‘certainty scale’.
[5]
English translation: dwarfs standing on
the shoulders of giants
[6]
Hence, there is no real tension between facts being ‘invented’ and facts being
‘true’
[7]
A difference between the two is that, social science claims are less costly to unmake than science ones.
For example convincing someone that the billion Euros spend in building the
Large Hadron Collider is a futile enterprise is harder than convincing someone that a qualitative interview study
is, as more allies have been mobilized. This is another contributing factor
which creates this apparent hierarchy between the sciences and social sciences.
