07/12/2014

Example of a literature summary

2014-12-02



Wadmann, S. (2014). Physician–industry collaboration: Conflicts of interest and the imputation of motive. Social Studies of Science, 0306312714525678.


Outline of the research
Government intervention with research can generate a contradictory set of circumstances. The study focuses on the case of industry involvement with clinical research in Denmark. Where on one side governmental policies welcome interaction between the industry and research as they potentially “economic interests will motivate researchers to develop knowhow and products that can strengthen Denmark’s competitive position in what is depicted as a global ‘knowledge economy’ (Aagaard and Mejlgaard, 2012[1]: 11).” (p. 532). But on the other hand this relationship is perceived as problematic because it casts doubt “whether economic interests influence professional recommendations” (p. 532). In both cases policies are designed to address the issue. However, they are seen as distinctive issues, because the first is perceived as generating economic gain for Denmark as whole, while the latter cast the financial gain of the individual scientists into question. Her argument is that “‘corporate’ and ‘academic’ research is entangled as physicians engage in industry trials to pursue their own research.“ (p. 533). The debate often focuses on the motivation of the physicians, which turns the public debate into “blame game” (p. 533), which is non informative if the process, is seen as a system.
Academics position
Analyses from academia pretty much fall along this good/bad divide. Where on one side the (good) aspects of “advancing medical innovation and technological dissemination” (p. 533) while on the other (bad) side the “risks of ‘biased’ knowledge production […,] unwanted commercialization of science […,] unwarranted alterations of prescription patterns […] and ‘disease mongering’” (p. 355) are emphasized. This perfectly mirrors the public debate about the industry clinical binary.
The rhetoric used in the proposals and applications of academics for grants is very much influenced by the rhetoric of policy than their actual day to day practice. This means that “research collaborations cannot be understood separately from the political landscape in which they operate” (p. 354), because “physicians’ ideas of legitimate exchange are shaped by politico-economic conditions of possibility” (p. 534). However, when drawing physicians to accountability, the motivation is always simplified to a one dimensional pecuniary motivation (or sometimes desire for prestige). That this simple motivational spectrum cannot account for possible other forms of motivations is of little concern. [this is very much a neoliberal assumption]. Furthermore, “a phenomenon is not explained by explicating a given constellation of anticipated interests” (p. 534)

Public-private links with clinical research
Researchers emphasize the independence they get from conducting private research. As they can ‘nest’ their own research within these larger projects, but more common can allocate the funds to their ‘own’ research. However, this influx depends on the availability “of human and material resources at the public hospitals“ (p. 535). For example a hospital might create facilities to better accommodate for private research trials (building facilities, allocating staff or working systems), which in term makes them more attractive to consecutive private research trials. “Thus, ‘public’ and ‘private’ research resources do not flow in distinct streams; they are premised on each other.” (p. 536).
On the other hand, the criticism depicts only “economic interests as a driver of physician–industry collaboration, and political intervention is motivated by concern that industry payments may bias physicians’ judgment at the expense of patients’ or ‘public’ interests.” (p. 538). This puts the blame on the practitioners and industry interaction and NOT on the system which made this collaboration necessary (or rallied for its implementation). Because, “the organization of research funding systems and institutional pressures towards high research productivity.” (p. 538) put pressure on already tight resources. As such, practitioners feel that they gain autonomy from this pressure (even if they have to bow to a different master now).
Industry dependency and academic freedom
Physicians acknowledge that they are dependent on the industry, because “‘medical science cannot exist without external [private/industry] partners – at least not at its current” (p. 539). This is due to the fact that the academic environment has changed for research. It several changes have occurred in the funding of public research; ”First, it has shifted from budgetary funding of research institutions towards greater competition for external project funding. Second, there has been a move from ‘free’ towards more ‘strategic’ research, in that more funds have been earmarked for research into politically defined problems and the promotion of industrial aims. Third, funds have been reallocated from multiple, smaller research grants towards fewer and larger grants” (p. 538). This has consequences for the research environment in that “These reforms are coupled with institutional pressures towards high research productivity. Measures such as the number of peer-reviewed publications, doctoral degrees, and patent applications have become benchmarks that guide Danish national research regulation, and these measures of research ‘productivity’ are translated into regulatory instruments such as university ‘development contracts’ and hospital audit systems” (p. 538), also in “highly competitive medical fields […] institutional pressures towards high research productivity are further fuelled by job competition.” (p. 539). Therefore, when academic speak of ‘academic’ freedom what they refer to is ‘the allocation of funds that are generated from privately funded projects to their own research’ and that they are less vulnerable to changes in the public funding environment. As such, the apparent oxymoron of dependency/freedom makes sense, BUT ONLY when considering the system in which (medical) academics operate.

Funding / research cycle
https://scontent-b.xx.fbcdn.net/hphotos-xfp1/v/t1.0-9/10702201_1558133007741824_6039976110289966191_n.jpg?oh=f520d252a4f45b243b3ac86ad51c8b07&oe=550C0AAAHow similar is this to this quote (p. 540) to the ‘shit academics say comic’?
“You earn your salary in the first couple of months [of your doctoral research] by working with industry-sponsored trials. At the same time, you apply for grants. When they come – if they come – many continue to do the trials, partly as a way of ‘paying back’ and partly as a way to create a foundation for the next generation. (Interview with resident, 2011)”

Figure 3 Grant cycle[2]
Contract research becomes something that researchers “ought to do” (p. 540) as it fulfils the generational contract to past and future researchers. However, this turns industry sponsoring into a “moral obligation” (p. 540) for medical academics. External investigators and industry executives put forth three potential problems, in their view, with this collaboration. These were: “(1) when dependency on collaboration leads physicians to expend resources on industry studies they considered a ‘waste of time’; (2) when industry executives worried that poor research quality may result from what they considered a downgrading of industry trials by health professionals; and (3) when economic self-interest was depicted in public debate as the main driver – and the main danger – of physician–industry collaborations.” (p. 540)
It is a waste of time, because the studies carried out does no add anything new to the scientific expertise, they primarily function as a way for pharmatheutical companies to obtain patens, or even in cases (phase IV studies) also serve as a marketing campaign. As such, when physicians imply that contract research isn’t ‘real’ research this is what they mean. Resources could be spend more productively on other projects. However, they do spent the majority of their time (75 – 80%) on these research trials because as one respondent put it: “we have to compromise a bit; when it’s not really interesting from my point of view. But that’s the way it is. When the funds start to dwindle” (p. 542).
Industry officials express concern regarding the scientific quality and are drawing into question the commitment of the scientists to their study because clinical researchers “might also run five other trials, and to make them then prioritize [one particular study] is a true challenge’” (p. 543). This also adds cost and draws the data quality into question, which usually adds to the cost of the trials. However, the industry doesn’t want to be too harsh in their critique ‘practical challenges’ of these aspects or when physicians are “not turn[ing] up for training sessions and meetings or fail[ing] to recruit patients in due time” (p. 543), because future collaboration might be put into jeopardy.

The conflict of interest debate
Politian’s urge for more transparency, to circumvent that physicians use fund for their own personal gain, calls their hippocratic oath into question. As such, turning the argument into a question of the morality of the practitioners, however they reply by questioning the morality of the Politicians. Because, “Politicians urge […] very loudly to collaborate with private companies but when it comes to payment, the arguments turn circular” (p. 544-545). The pharmatheutical industry often opts to remain quite, as they are put by default into the ‘bad guys’ position, and no matter what they do (publicly speak out or stay quite) all actions on their part are negatively interpreted. As such, the “public debates are easily led into moralistic ‘blame games’ (Hood, 2002) that focus public debates on morality while leaving unaddressed the political priorities and the research infrastructures that contribute to creating the feared COI [conflict of interest]”. (p. 545). The current trend for more transparency “Ironically, […] may serve to silence voices and generate new ‘unknowns’ that leave the public even more ignorant about some aspects of physician–industry collaboration” (p. 546), as it easier to stay mute than taking up the fight.
Things to take away for my research 
  • Explaining an ‘interest’ behind an action does not necessarily describe the outcome of an action. The framework has to be taken into account as well.
  • The rhetoric of political system for more “industry collaboration which can generate profit” is misguided in medical practice, as it ignores the existing correlation of industry and academic collaboration, which is quite different in practice.
  • The morality of a situation depends on what connections you make. The medical professionals justify their position as morally right, given the framework they have to operate in. Similarly do the Politicians, when only taking into account their preconceptions of how the relationship between research and industry ‘ought’ to work. As such, morality becomes relative to the particular circumstances.


[1] Aagaard K and Mejlgaard N (2012) PĂ¥ vej mod en ny forskningspolitik [Towards a new research
politics]. In: Aagaard K and Mejlgaard N (eds) Dansk forskningspolitik efter Ă¥rtusindskiftet
[Danish Research Politics after the Turn of the Century]. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press,
pp. 11–35.


Thoughts on the methodology of my PhD



27-11-2014

If Law 2004 is right in his assumption that no method is neutral as it always reinforces a particular type of social order. Then, this also applies for the results of this methodology, i.e. the knowledge created. Because, the methodology used to create this method is intimately bound up with the knowledge creating process, as it provides the lens through which knowledge is formulated, framed and analysed (c.f. Pinch and Bijker 1987).
If this is the case, than the focus on impact of this knowledge is not a far-fetched concept, as it gives you a means to make these choices between different methodologies. Because, “which realities [do we want]? Which do we want to help to make more real, and which less real? How do we want to interfere (because interfere we will, one way or another)?” (Law and Urry 2004:406). Therefore, when policy makers want to make “people think just a little bit more about how what they’re doing [and how it] could be used in the future” (Calvert 2006:211). The focus on impact addresses exactly the aforementioned point about ‘which reality do we want?’ So, the questions is why should or shouldn’t we have the discussion of impact?
By addressing this question in the forms of interviews, it allows a chance to reveal the underlying assumptions of the epistemology, ontology and social values used by scientist, policy makers and end-users. In fact, interviews quite possibly represent the only form of approach that comes close to in being able to analyse this. Because, you are interested in;

  • The personal views of the subjects
  • The connections the subjects draw
  • The inferences the subjects make
  • The assumptions the subjects make
  • etc., to only mention a few


This creates a highly complex network, were all these aspects intermingle to form the opinion of the subjects (c.f. Shapin 2010). You cannot choose between a realist, a phenomenological or a social constructionist position; it is all of these and more. If you use, any singular approach, position or analysis from this trifecta you are missing the subtleties, interconnections and intricacies of the situation. As such, “we will have to learn how to slow down at each step.” (Latour 2005:17). This obviously will make the analysis “slower and harder” (Venturini 2010:259), but it’s the only way grasp the entirety of the complex assemblage what is society and science. This is an entire new epistemology  (Latour, Harmon et al. 2011). But, only this “slowciology” (Latour 2005:122) allows you not to crush the other aspects of the network, that do not fall into the analytical boxes of the conventional trifectas of epistemologies. 
As this represents a new epistemology; traditional quantitative or qualitative method would surely give you some insights into the behaviour of the subjects, which might be interesting of it in of itself, but leaves you unable to address the why question. Only, talking to these subjects, exploring the complex network of associations allows you the slightest chance about some sort of inference to address the why. Because, “[o]ur only hope, our only peace is to understand [the why … without understanding the why] you are powerless” (Wachowski and Wachowski 2003).[i] So, the best way forward is to ask them why?
References




[i] Matrix Reloaded 2003 http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0234215/

Snälla inte en anti-rasism demonstration till…

2014-03-14

Vilken är den senaste anti-rasism grej du ha ’likat’ pĂ¥ facebook? När var det senaste gĂ¥ngen du pĂ¥pekade hur pass ’korkad’ Sverigedemokraterna är?  Funder du om att deltar i en demonstration mot ’rasistiskt-vĂ¥ld’? Om dessa frĂ¥gor stämmer in pĂ¥ dig, be jag dig att fĂ¥ en liten stund av din värdefulla tid i den passionerade kampen mot rasism. Jag vet att du inte kommer hĂ¥lla med mig, och det är OK. Men kanske jag kan väcka en liten tanke vart jag anser det riktiga problemet ligger.

Rasismen och främlingsfientlighet ha alltid funnits och troligtvis kommer alltid finnas. För rasismen erbjuder en enkel förklaringsmodell, till varför vissa ha det bättre och vissa ha det sämre. Därmed kommer den alltid vara attraktiv för idioter eftersom detta erbjuder en förklaringsmodell som de förstĂ¥. Dess vidare, finns det goda dokumenterade samband när det blir tufft ekonomiskt, brukar folk rösta mer främlingsfientliga och rasitiska partier. SĂ¥, vad är problemet? Varför säger jag ”snälla inte en anti-rasism demonstration till”?

Vad är det vi vill egentligen med dessa demonstrationer? Personera som deltar vill troligtvis manifestera att Sverige, dvs. ”välvilliga svenskar”, är människor som vill att alla människor ska bli lika behandlade och ha lika rättigheter oavsett härkomst. LĂ¥ter ju jätte trevligt! 'Detta är nĂ¥got jag kan ställa mig bakom och visa att jag är en god människa!' Men lika mycket som rasismen är en förenkling av verkligheten, är detta ocksĂ¥ det. För lever vi verkligen i ett sĂ¥dant samhälle? Ă„r alla vĂ¥ra ekonomiska, politiska och sociala beslut verkligen sĂ¥ i människors vardag?

Exempelen som jag ska presentera kommer ifrĂ¥n Göteborg, eftersom det är den staden jag är mest bekant med i min forskning. MEN argumentet som jag vill presentera ha applikation för hela landet. Jag vill belysa tre aspekter av stadsdelen Ă–stra Bergsjön i Ă–stra Göteborg. Ungefär 83 procent av de människor som bor där ha utländskt bakgrund, detta är inte högsta andelen i Göteborg men näst intill (Hjällbo ha 89,3). Med andra ord det är där invandrarna bor eller som en rasist skulle säga ”svartskallen”, dvs. människor som vi pratar om när vi utrycker oss om främlingsfientlighet och rasismen. Medelivslängden i Sverige ligger pĂ¥ 81,4 Ă¥r för män och 84,6 för kvinnor. Därmed placeras Sverige pĂ¥ plats 10 pĂ¥ världsranglistan. Medelivslängden i Ă–stra Bergsjön är 75 för män och 81 för kvinnor, vilket är den likvärdig plats 44 i samma lista. Medelinkomsten i Sverige är pĂ¥ 295 000 kr, medan den är pĂ¥ 135 000 kr i Ă–stra Bergsjön, fattigsdomsgränsen i Sverige ligger pĂ¥ 114 000 kr. Arbetslösheten i Sverige är pĂ¥ ungefär 8 %, vilket ungefär ge Sverige en arbetslöshet som är jämförelsevis med länder som Belgien, Storbritannien och Finland. Arbetslösheten i Ă–stra Bergsjön är 52 %, vilket betyder att man fĂ¥ gĂ¥ till länder som Nepal, Namibia och Djibouti för att hitta motsvarande siffor i arbetslösheten.

SĂ¥ vart är passionen och demonstrationerna för att kämpa mot dessa problem? Självklart är Ă–stra Bergsjön ett extrem exempel, MEN de andra stadsdelarna i Göteborg där ’invandrana bor’, ha exakt samma mönster. Dvs. hög arbetslöshet, hög bidrags tagande, dĂ¥lig hälsa segregation etc., fattigdomen i Sverige ha en etnisk dimension! Det är naiv att pĂ¥stĂ¥ att det inte skulle vara sĂ¥ och en till manifestation mot rasismen lär inte lösa de problemen som folk ha i dessa omrĂ¥den. Självklart är problematiken komplext, men att utpeka extrema högern som mĂ¥ltavla och satsa all energi pĂ¥ de kommer inte förändra den bakomliggande problematiken. Extrem rasism är ett symptom av dessa samhällsproblem, inte dess primära orsak. För tänk, om invandrare i Ă–stra Bergsjön hade jobb som medelsvensson, inte behövde socialbidrag för de ha en adekvat inkomst, inte var segregerade som de är nu. Tror du att de argumenten som lockar extrem nazisterna till sig skulle vara lika kraftfulla dĂ¥? Troligtvis inte, för fattigdom är ett problem, fattigdom ge upphov till vĂ¥ld, kriminalitet, utanförskap och segregation. Men att ’springa pĂ¥ stan och vifta i en flagga mot rasismen’ kommer troligtvis fĂ¥ dig att mĂ¥ bra och fylla din ’jag ha gjort nĂ¥t för samhället behöv’ men det kommer troligtvis inte förändrar situationen för människorna i Ă–stra Bergsjön, sĂ¥ prioriteringar tack…

(alla statistik är siffror som är mellan perioden 2009 – 2013).

Källor:http://www.goteborgsfria.se/artikel/95248
http://storstad.wordpress.com/2010/02/03/fattigdom-i-sverige-statistiken/
www4.goteborg.se/statistik
http://www.angered.org/bergsjon.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_unemployment_rate
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_life_expectancy

The Futility of the ‘Science(-tism)’ vs Religion Debate

2014-02-02


In this essay I try to give my view on the science vs religion debate. However, it would be more appropriate to call it the scientism vs religion debate as most scientists are usually too busy with ‘doing science’ and therefore refrain from the debate. The people involved in the debate are often (self-proclaimed) defenders of science in the (perceived) threat of religion, a popular example would Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris or Neil deGrasse Tyson, among others. However, the account I want to make here touches upon more general points concerning the futility, challenges and implications of this debate. Already in 1975 Paul Feyerabend wrote in his book ‘Against method’:

“[S]cience can stand on its own feet and does not need any help from rationalists, secular humanists, Marxists and similar religious movements; and... non-scientific cultures, procedures and assumptions can also stand on their own feet and should be allowed to do so... Science must be protected from ideologies; and societies, especially democratic societies, must be protected from science... In a democracy scientific institutions, research programmes, and suggestions must therefore be subjected to public control, there must be a separation of state and science just as there is a separation between state and religious institutions, and science should be taught as one view among many and not as the one and only road to truth and reality.”
Now many of the things Feyerabend claimed can, and should be, challenged. But this quote touches upon some points I want to make here in this essay, e.g. that science represents one form of knowledge among many.  The general argument in this essay is that scientism, as exemplified in the science vs. religion, is a problem for society in general. As scientism elevates science to a level it cannot possibly match, undermining the authority of science. 
Let me try to break down this general argument into three different reasons, why this is so. The first reasons touches upon the ability of science to “stand on its own feet”, explaining why science and religion are separate incommensurable spheres. The second reason addresses the “help [of] rationalists, secular humanists [and atheists]”, arguing that the’ help’ they provide is more damaging to science than attacks from religious groups. And lastly, building on the previous points and reiterating that “science should be taught as one view among many and not as the one and only road to truth and reality”.

The Ability to Stand Alone
One common assumption that religious defenders and atheists alike, make in the ‘science’ vs. religion debate is that these two different belief systems are comparable (and yes, science is a belief system, and I will return to this point!). Superficially, they give the impression that they are comparable, because they address the same subjects, e.g. creation of the earth, human morale, or human nature etc. However, in religion there is the notion of absolute ‘Truth’ capital T, meanwhile in science, there might exist such a thing but it certainly is unobtainable by its human practitioners. In addition to this, they also differ how truth and knowledge are validated and obtained. Let’s take the aforementioned example of the creation of the earth, to elaborate this difference in how truth is accessed and validated. 
The religious argument claims: "The earth is X years old"
The scientific argument claims: "The earth is Y years old"
Now because X does not equal Y, the assumption is that one has to be wrong. However, this is only the case if these two statements are comparable, which they are not. By investigating the premises that lead to these different conclusions this becomes obvious. 
Religious premise: "This particular holy text states the earth is X years old."
Scientific premise: "This particular scientific theory postulates that the earth is Y years old."
The religious premise is absolute and allows for revelation of truth trough scripture. On the other hand, the scientific premise is a ‘best model approach’ and denies revelation through scripture, while basing conclusion on ‘observable facts’. Without having to go into the problems that can arise from revelation of scripture (e.g. multiple interpretations) or ‘observable facts’ (e.g. theory laden bias) it should be quite clear now that these are NOT comparable approaches, in fact they are mutually exclusive. However, inside their respective frame of reference they are true and valid points. As such, only by comparing these two different approaches do they become ‘false’. Now this deconstruction might appear silly and petty, however, its implication is from it. Because, as each different belief system ascribes to different approaches how truth is accessed and validated, using the other system as a counterargument will obviously fail. This basic difference is a prime reason why it is futile to explain scientific facts to religious people as arguments for atheism, as they adhere to different frameworks. 
Bruno Latour discusses this point in his book ‘On Modern Cult of the Factish Gods’ from a science studies point of view, he deconstructs both science and religion into human belief system based upon artefacts, rituals and trust.  If you start to claiming that one is superior to the other (as is done when they are directly compared) you are contradicting the function and form of both science or religion. To deny the rituals, materialisties, social conventions in either form of belief system is to treat it them as a black box, making the error of simplification. The next part deals with this simplification error.

The Unhelpful Helper
The common ground that resurfaces in the science vs. religion debate is that each side has a definition of ‘what science is’. Now these obviously differ from individual to individual, but the general representation of science from its defenders is that; Science is an empirical based practice that builds on evidence, creating objective truths. This definition is totally removed from the actual practice of science.
First of all, the sheer notion that objectivity is a possible outcome of science is false. In philosophical terms science builds upon two general methods, induction and falsification. Both forms cannot produce objective truths, and as such human interpretation is paramount to their application, i.e. subjective interpretation. In addition to this grave philosophical error two further mistake are inherent in this definition. Firstly, it assumes that there is a definition for science at all and secondly, that there is a clear ‘demarcation criteria’ that separates scientific forms of knowledge from non-scientific forms of knowledge. The definition of science and the pursuit to find a ‘demarcation criteria’ has been the holy grail of the philosophy of science since its inception. However, what they found is that neither exits and that science is strongly shaped by its practitioners, i.e. there is no ‘science’ only the ‘practice of science’. As a reaction to this the discipline of the sociology of scientific knowledge and subsequently science and technology studies was created to study the ‘practice of science’, in order to better understand what ‘science is’. These inquires uniformly showed that science is a belief system with its own customs, rituals and artefacts. This claim was initially perceived as a ‘attack’ upon the authority of science. Similarly today any claims that science represents a belief system are also rigorously attacked by advocates of scientism. The first wave of attacking this insight culminated into the so called ‘Science Wars’ spanning the 1990s. This initial conflict of sociologist of science and scientists (e.g. Steve Weinberg) has now largely been resolved; the consensus accepts that science is a human construction dependent upon its practitioners. An important point to make here is that claiming science is a human construction is not the same as saying science is useless. On the contrary science is the best approximation of nature that is currently available to us. However, it is just that, an approximation, depending on humans creating this approximation. 
Now, when science gets thrown into the ‘science vs. religion debate’ it is often done from a Scientism view of science. Scientism according to ‘The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought’ sees science as “characteristic inductive methods of the natural sciences [that] are the only source of genuine factual knowledge and, in particular, that they alone can yield true knowledge about man and society.” The first part of this belief simplifies the scientific process, removing the multiplicity of interpretation, conflicts and contradictions involved in the construction, i.e. creating a black box. However, the personal interests of its practitioners, conflicting data in its measurements or the politics of society, that often are presented as ‘impurities’, are a central part of science. As such, arguing for a more 'logical' 'rational' or less 'biased' science that would be able to transcend these aspects is actually non-nonsensical, as these aspects are not only inherent to the practice of science; they are central parts of it. Now when genuine controversies arise within science, e.g. the finer details of anthropomorphic global climate (see Paul N. Edward’s ‘A vast Machine’) these are perceived as ‘failures of science’ instead of being a natural part of it. The oversimplified presentation of science creates the illusion that science can achieve objective truths, transcending these influences, something that is simply not true. This Scientism version of science does not help defend scientific authority; to the contrary it undermines it. Because, it elevates science to a standard it cannot possibly meet and thereby setting it up for certain failure.  This presentation of science is naive at best and dis-ingeniousness at worst
The following section deals with second part of the definition of Scientism “that [science] alone can yield true knowledge about man and society”.

Multiplicity of ‘Truth’
If science really would be the only achievable way to obtain “true knowledge”, than we first have to agree upon what ‘truth’ actually is. So let’s for a second set aside the science vs religion debate, and turn our focus upon 'truth'. Well what is truth? Here are short (by no means extensive) lists of different versions that have been suggested by different sources. 
A.     Truth is an abstract quality of the universe that is 'true' regardless of human opinion that occupies a separate realm (e.g. Platonism) 
B.     Truth is combination of material factors (although unreachable to human experience) that combine with conceptual functions and social convention to form a reinforcing network that is regarded as true (e.g. actor-network theory) 
C.     There no such thing as Truth and we are all deceiving ourselves and living in our own fantasy (e.g. extreme forms of nihilism)

Well depending on your version of truth, the answer for the science religion debate is going to differ. Because for A, neither science nor religion can claim this, B is true for science, but also for religion and in C the whole concept of truth is suspended. Now I am not saying that these versions of truth (A, B or C) are the definite ones, these are only a few examples. However, my point being, if you make a statement such as ‘science alone can yield true knowledge’, which form of truth are you referring to?
Let us further deconstruct the notion of ‘true knowledge’ as produced by science. Well first of all that point isn't entirely true. There have been plenty of cases where implementations of science have caused more harm than good, as it turned out the science was ‘wrong’. Implementations of science are often mobilised by people adhering to Scientism when defending science (e.g. computers, non-stick frying pans or solar power). However, when criticised on this ground the counterargument that is raised builds upon the aforementioned simplistic view of science and usually sound something like this: 

"But it’s the implementation, that are wrong not science! Science is pure, for example it is political influences that complicate pure scientific implementation“

Answering this point has to be done in two parts. First of all yes, there have been plenty of cases where political interference complicated the implementation of science. But, secondly and more important for the here presented account, there also have been cases where science implementations have been simply wrong (e.g. racial discrimination, persecution of homosexuality and sterilisation of people with mental disorder etc.). Yes, there has been change and progress in the scientific view concerning these subjects, but that’s just the point: it changes! At the time of their implementation these practices were supported by ‘scientific evidence’ of the time. If the advocate of Scientism is still not convinced, one last counterargument is put forth, that builds on the same simplified view of science, usually it sound something like this 

“But this is the implementation of science, not science itself”

This is true on a trivial level, but in the practice of science these are interconnected, as implementations of science secures funding and leads to more science. This is one reason why scientists try to be ‘socially relevant’. Furthermore, if you do not measure science success by its implementation, than what do you measure is it by? If you do not acknowledge the 'bad' implementations and only count the good ones, this is very … unscientific?

If ‘science’ really is the only way to achieve true knowledge, than not only is religion discounted as form of knowledge but also; feminism, philosophy or literature to only mention a few, as these are not 'sciences'. The English word science as the peculiar trait that it’s meaning is only reserved for the 'natural sciences' ("Naturwissenschafften" in German or “naturvetenskap” in Swedish). Yet, other forms of knowledge are certainly sources of insightful and usable knowledge, even if they have different mechanism of achieving ‘true knowledge’. 

And lastly, with everything we have learned so far, the definition of science from the Scientism point of view is a very arrogant claim. Science is done by people; it is a human project. People are not perfect, hence science is not perfect. This point alone should suffice to show the futility in the scientism position. I want to conclude with the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

“Our scientific power has outrun our spiritual power. We have guided missiles and miss-guided men.”
Long ago I started this blog to track my progress through the PhD application process. Updates were frequent at first but then slowly faded off. In the end there was no new post, before this one. So I like to appoligize. But, I have good news: I have started my PhD. Below is a link to my PhD page. 

http://www.surrey.ac.uk/shtm/people/rene_brauer/

Here is a link to a publication I made:

http://www.bulletinofgeography.umk.pl/25_2014/Brauer.pdf

Here is my latest essay: 

https://www.academia.edu/9647856/An_open_letter_to_feminists

So, as you can see, I have been busy. 

I hope to update now more regularly. 

kind regards

René